ADVERSE POSSESSION AND TAKINGS
SELDOM COMPENSATION FOR CHANCE HAPPENINGS
Martin J. Foncello∗
INTRODUCTION
1

The law of adverse possession is relatively settled. Generally, a
trespasser’s possession of another’s property will result in a transfer of
title if the possession was adverse, exclusive, open and notorious, and
2
uninterrupted for the statutory period. By failing to assert the right
to exclude within the statutory period, the true owner loses title to
3
4
the property and is without claim for compensation or damages.
5
Federal takings law, on the other hand, is relatively unsettled.
While the Fifth Amendment’s requirement that the government must
pay just compensation for any land taken for public purpose is
6
straightforward, it has proven difficult in application. The Takings
∗
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1
Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 NW.
U. L. REV. 1122, 1122 (1984) (“The law of adverse possession tends to be regarded as
a quiet backwater.”).
2
Classic legal scholarship on adverse possession is in agreement on the elements
necessary to make out a claim. See Henry W. Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32
HARV. L. REV. 135 (1918); Henry W. Ballantine, Claim of Title in Adverse Possession, 28
YALE L.J. 219 (1918); Percy Bordwell, Mistake and Adverse Possession, 7 IOWA L. BULL.
129 (1922); William Edwin Taylor, Actual Possession in Adverse Possession of Land, 25
IOWA L. REV. 78 (1939); William F. Walsh, Title by Adverse Possession, 16 N.Y.U. L.Q.
REV. 539 (1939) (part 1); William F. Walsh, Title by Adverse Possession, 17 N.Y.U. L.Q.
REV. 44 (1939) (part 2).
3
Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, supra note 2, at 139.
4
See, e.g., Rogers v. Marlin, 754 So. 2d 1267, 1273 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (stating
that “damages are never a part of adverse possession”).
5
William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and
the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 887 (1995) (stating that “takings law today
is incoherent”).
6
The terms of the Fifth Amendment are some of the “most common and
difficult terms in our legal lexicon, linked together in sentences of great power but
of equally great abstraction.” RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 20 (1985). Courts have had difficulty applying these
terms to the many complex, and even bizarre, situations possible in the modern
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Clause has become a hotbed of the Constitution, with its panoply of
precedent stretching and twisting to fit into the year’s new litigation,
potentially as numerous as the regulations that invade every aspect of
7
our modern life.
But at the point where these two legal doctrines cross, there is a
no man’s land, void of analysis by a federal court until Pascoag
8
Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island. In Pascoag Reservoir, the District
Court of Rhode Island was presented with an issue that had not
9
previously surfaced in federal jurisprudence. Pascoag Reservoir, also
know as Echo Lake, is an artificial body of water located in the towns
10
of Burrillville and Glocester, Rhode Island. Pascoag Reservoir &
11
Dam, LLC’s predecessor in title created the lake in 1860. In 1964,

state. See generally Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S.
327 (1922) (military battery overlooking beach resort); Village of Euclid v. Amber
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (zoning regulations reduced value of property by
seventy-five percent); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (military flights
over chicken farm); United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947) (flooding of
land); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (federal law requires
disclosure of trade secret); Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1988) (sheep
killed by protected grizzly bears); Moerman v. California, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1993) (endangered elk destroyed fences and ate forage); Am. Heart Ass’n v.
County of Greenville, 489 S.E.2d 921 (S.C. 1997) (retention by Probate Court of
original will and signature of famous baseball player).
7
The most recent cases to set practitioners and the academy abuzz include:
Brown v. Legal Found. of Washington, 538 U.S. 216 (2003) (5-4 decision) (state
directs interest earned on funds in IOLTA accounts to legal services); Tahoe-Sierra
Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg. Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (moratorium on
development while environmental agency could determine impact of development
on lake); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (state regulation preventing
owner from developing coastal wetlands).
8
337 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 962 (2003).
9
Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island, 217 F. Supp. 2d 206, 217
(D.R.I. 2002). One student commentator has already discussed this case. See
Kimberly A. Selemba, Comment, The Interplay Between Property Law and Constitutional
Law: How the Government (Un)Constitutionally “Takes” Land Dirt Cheap, 108 PENN ST. L.
REV. 657 (2003). Selemba’s Comment directly follows the reasoning of the district
court. See id. at 664-75. Selemba describes the issues, but does not bring theory to
bear. This Comment, on the other hand, explores the theoretical underpinnings of
the requirement of just compensation and analyzes other issues not thoroughly
explored by the district court. Such issues include: whether the takings claim accrues
from the moment of actual entry or when title is vested in the adverse possessor,
whether requiring compensation by the government would undermine the
justifications for adverse possession, and whether adverse possession is a background
principle of state property law.
10
Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 337 F.3d at 90.
11
Id.
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the State of Rhode Island purchased a lot abutting the reservoir.
One year later, the state constructed a boat ramp, whose supports
13
extended into the company’s property. Community members used
14
the boat ramp to access the lake. This use went uninterrupted until
1997, when after several years of failed negotiations between the
parties for the sale of the lake, Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC
erected a “No Trespassing” sign at the water’s edge, trying to limit the
15
public’s use of the water. The State then brought suit in state court
seeking to quiet title to the land via a theory of uninterrupted adverse
16
possession. In 2001, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that
the state had acquired the part of the lake bottom under the boat
ramp by adverse possession and had acquired a prescriptive easement
17
for the public to use the boat ramp to access the lake.
In 2002, Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC brought suit in federal
18
court seeking just compensation.
The district court held that,
although the state’s acquisition of a fee simple in land through
19
adverse possession is a taking, the federal takings claim must be
dismissed because the company failed to pursue the available state
20
remedy in a timely fashion. Alternatively, the court held that the
company’s twenty-six year delay in bringing suit was unreasonable
21
and that the claim was barred by the doctrine of laches.
In 2003, the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
22
court’s dismissal of the claim
without passing upon the
constitutional question of whether adverse possession by the
23
government is a compensable taking. The First Circuit concluded
12

Id.
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 337 F.3d at 90.
17
Reitsma v. Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC, 774 A.2d 826, 838 (R.I. 2001) (3-2
decision).
18
Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 209.
19
Id. at 222.
20
Id. at 228.
21
Id.
22
Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 337 F.3d at 90.
23
Id. The First Circuit followed the fundamental notion of judicial restraint
where constitutional questions are not answered in absence of their exigency. For
support of this principle of judicial restraint, see Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 446 (1988); Three Affiliated Tribes of Ft. Berthold
Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157-58 (1984); Leroy v. Great W.
United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 181 (1979); Massachusetts v. Westcott, 431 U.S. 322, 323
13
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that even if such a claim were viable, the company failed to bring the
state claim for compensation in a timely fashion and its federal
24
takings claim was therefore forfeited.
This Comment will attempt to steer a path through this “curious
25
juncture between property law and constitutional law” and answer
the question unresolved by the First Circuit in Pascoag Reservoir: Does
a governmental actor’s acquisition of land by adverse possession give
26
rise to a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment? This
Comment will assert that the government must pay just compensation
for land acquired through adverse possession. The underlying
rationales for both adverse possession and the constitutional
prohibition on takings without just compensation compel such a
result.
In Part I, this Comment will examine the different methods
through which a governmental actor can acquire land, such as
condemnation and prescription, and the constitutional limits on
each method. Part II will employ the district court’s opinion in
Pascoag Reservoir as a portal through which to explore the
constitutional argument that the government’s physical invasion of
private property for the statutory period is a taking. The Comment
will contrast the decisions of the district court in Pascoag Reservoir with
the few state courts that have addressed whether adverse possession
by the government is a compensable taking. In addition, the
Comment will demonstrate the merits of the district court’s position
by providing a detailed analysis of the statutes of limitation on the
remedies available to the true owner for the government’s physical
invasion. In Part III, it will then allay the potential concerns of some
commentators by illustrating that requiring the government to
compensate for land taken by adverse possession would not
undermine the rationales underlying the doctrine. Recalling the
four justifications of adverse possession that were put forth by
Professor Thomas Merrill in his classic article, Property Rules, Liability
27
Rules, and Adverse Possession, the Comment will argue that both the
eminent domain power and the statute of limitation for the takings
claim will minimize the impact that the compensation requirement
(1977); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633 (1972); Burton v. United States,
196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905).
24
Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 337 F.3d at 96.
25
Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 209.
26
Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 337 F.3d at 90.
27
Merrill, supra note 1, at 1128-32.
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has on these rationales. Finally, in Part IV it will argue that the
Takings Clause is a fundamental limitation on government
overreaching and that the government cannot evade this obligation
28
by virtue of adverse possession. The government is not exempt from
paying compensation in this context because adverse possession does
not fall within the narrow reach of the “background principles of
state property law” exception announced by the Supreme Court in
29
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.
I. METHODS THROUGH WHICH THE GOVERNMENT MAY ACQUIRE
PRIVATE LAND AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS
There are multiple methods through which the government can
acquire property from a private landowner. The first of these
methods, condemnation, deals with: (1) the express taking of land
through exercise of the power of eminent domain; and (2) inverse
condemnation, where in absence of the exercise of the power of
eminent domain, the state takes land through physical appropriation
30
or excessive regulation.
The second method by which the
government can acquire land is through the doctrine of adverse uses.
Under this doctrine, the government may acquire land by adverse
possession and prescriptive easement—property rights that, in many
31
respects, are equivalent in form and substance.
I-A. Eminent Domain
Eminent domain is the right of the sovereign, as the ultimate
32
owner of all real property, to recall private land for public purposes.
The origin of the sovereign’s right to acquire title to private property
33
by condemnation antedates constitutions and legislative enactments.
This right is “an incident to sovereignty, inherent in and belonging to
34
every sovereign state.” The power of eminent domain is said to be
28

Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 226 (noting that “[t]he
government cannot escape the Takings Clause by opting to sit by until title is
transferred to it”).
29
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
30
See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 322 n.17.
31
Merrill, supra note 1, at 1124 (characterizing prescription as “a first cousin of
adverse possession”).
32
Haig v. Wateree Power Co., 112 S.E. 55, 57 (S.C. 1922).
33
Id.
34
Johnston v. Alabama Public Serv. Comm’n, 252 So. 2d 75, 76 (Ala. 1971) (per
curiam).
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“one of the unwritten laws of all civilized nations.”
The power of eminent domain is a product of political
36
necessity. The sovereign would find it difficult, if not impossible, to
construct highways, bridges, sewers, waterlines, or any other public
37
necessities that may arise, without the power of eminent domain. It
would be difficult for the government to piece together enough
38
voluntary transactions to complete one of these projects. The high
transaction costs associated with trying to find the landowners and
then to successfully negotiate a fair price may deter progress and
39
frustrate public goals. The government can bypass these difficulties
40
by exercising the right of eminent domain.
Although the power of eminent domain is a basic element of
41
sovereignty, it is not without limitation. The Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment limits the federal government’s ability to divest a
landowner of property. The Fifth Amendment states, “nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just
42
compensation.” The Takings Clause is incorporated into the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore applies
43
to the states.
The “public use” limitation prescribes that the government may
not take land for whatever purpose it pleases, but may only take for a
44
public purpose.
While sound in theory, this limitation is rather
porous due to the Supreme Court’s formulation of a loose standard
45
to determine which acts purportedly take land for a public purpose.
For the taking to be considered for a public use, there must be a
46
“rational relationship to some conceivable public purpose.” One
35

Haig, 112 S.E. at 57.
United States v. 4,450.72 Acres of Land, 27 F. Supp. 167, 172 (D. Minn. 1939)
(quoting Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875)).
37
See EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 3-6.
38
Id.
39
It is the potential for “hold outs” that drives up the transaction costs. Id.
Eminent domain eliminates the problem of the one uncooperative landowner who
seeks to improve his bargaining position. Id.
40
Id.
41
9 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 80.01(b)(1) (David A. Thomas ed., 1999).
42
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
43
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
44
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
45
See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 243-45 (1984) (“The Court
long ago rejected any literal requirement that condemned property be put into use
for the general public.”).
46
Montgomery v. Carter County, 226 F.3d 758, 765 (6th Cir. 2000) (internal
36
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court astutely pointed out that few takings would fail to meet this
47
standard. Furthermore, the reviewing court will show deference to
the legislative decision as to what constitutes a public use unless the
48
use is without reasonable foundation.
The second limitation, the payment of “just compensation,” is a
49
fundamental limitation on the actions of the state.
It is well
established that, “[t]he power to take and the obligation to indemnify
50
for the taking are inseparable.”
The owner should be fully
indemnified for the loss sustained when his property is taken for
51
The private landowner is compensated for the loss
public use.
52
suffered to him, not the benefit gained by the government.
I-B. Inverse Condemnation
Inverse condemnation is defined as “a cause of action against a
quotation marks omitted) (discussing Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229
(1984)).
47
Id. at 765-66.
48
Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241. Some commentators have questioned whether courts
have given municipalities too much deference allowing condemnations for purposes
seemingly tangential to a public use and whether a “more rigorous standard” is
required. See DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., LAND USE 294 (4th ed. 2004). The Supreme
Court recently granted certiorari in Kelo v. City of New London, 73 U.S.L.W. 3178
(Sept. 28, 2004) (No. 04-108), raising speculation that the deferential public use
standard expressed in Midkiff will be reevaluated. In Kelo, the Connecticut Supreme
Court upheld the city’s condemnation of private residences where the land was to be
developed pursuant to an economic development plan that aimed to compliment
the expansion of a local pharmaceutical company’s facilities. Kelo v. City of New
Haven, 843 A.2d 500, 507-08 (Conn. 2004). The Connecticut court held that the
exercise of eminent domain power to “promote municipal economic development
by creating new jobs, increasing tax and other revenues, otherwise revitalizing
distressed urban areas, constituted a valid public use.” Id. at 531.
49
As Justice Holmes cautioned, “[w]e are in danger of forgetting that a strong
public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the
desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.” Penn.
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
50
Drury v. Midland R. Co., 127 Mass. 571, 576 (1879).
51
It can be difficult to determine the value of what is taken. As Justice Brandeis
stated, “[v]alue is a word of many meanings.” Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n of Missouri, 262 U.S. 276, 310 (1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring in the
judgment). In Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, the Court examined a claim for
compensation to a laundry service company for the government’s temporary use and
occupancy of the laundry service for servicemen. 338 U.S. 1 (1949). Justice
Frankfurter noted that to fix the amount of compensation requires a well informed
“guess” as to what the property owner would have received in a voluntary exchange.
Id. at 5-6.
52
Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910) (Holmes,
J.) (“[T]he question is, What has the Owner lost? not, What has the taker gained?”).
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governmental defendant to recover the value of property which has
been taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no
formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted
53
by the taking agency.” The two situations where the government
may take property include: (1) the physical appropriations of
property for public use; and (2) restrictions on uses of property
54
which are so severe that they are tantamount to a condemnation.
To determine the type of taking that is implicated, one must
55
focus on the character of the government invasion.
When the
government physically appropriates land, the finding of a taking is
56
fairly obvious. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Loretto v. Teleprompter
57
Manhattan CATV Corporation announced a categorical rule to
determine when a taking has occurred. The Court held that
governmental action that can be fairly characterized as a permanent
58
physical occupation of property is a taking.
A taking is not self-evident, however, when the owner contends
that a law or regulation so severely restricts the use of the land as to
59
60
amount to a taking. The analysis is much more complex. The
logical starting point of regulatory taking analysis is Justice Holmes’
oft-quoted statement that, “if regulation goes too far it will be
61
recognized as a taking.” For more than eighty years, the Court has
been trying to come up with a formulation to identify those
62
regulations that go “too far.”

53

United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980) (quoting D. HAGMAN, URBAN
PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 328 (1971)) (internal quotations
omitted) (Court’s emphasis omitted).
54
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 322 n.17.
55
See generally id. at 324-25.
56
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617 (“The clearest sort of taking occurs when the
government encroaches upon or occupies private land for its own proposed use.”).
57
458 U.S. 419 (1982).
58
Id. at 434-35. The rule announced by the Court in Loretto was not surprising.
See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967). Michelman
noted that, “[t]he one incontestable case for compensation” is where the
government “regularly” uses or “permanently” occupies land under private
ownership. Id. at 1184. Further he noted that, “courts never deny compensation for
a physical takeover.” Id.
59
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 322 n.17.
60
Id.
61
Penn. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415.
62
Id.
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In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Court announced
a second categorical rule defining one instance where a regulation
has gone “too far.” The Court held that “when the owner of real
property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial
uses in the name of the common good, . . . he has suffered a
64
taking.” The Lucas rule only applies to regulations that deprive the
landowner of all economically beneficial uses of the land.
Regulations whose impact comes short of a “complete elimination in
value,” or a “total loss,” require analysis under the Penn Central
65
Transportation Co. v. City of New York balancing test.
Under the Penn Central balancing test, the court will engage in
“ad hoc, factual inquiries” to determine if there has been a regulatory
66
taking.
Factors the court will consider include “the economic
impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment67
backed expectations, and the character of the governmental action.”
63

505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
Id. at 1019.
65
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 330 (referring to the balancing test
announced in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
66
Penn. Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
67
Id. The reader should note that this Comment does not provide an in-depth
look at federal takings jurisprudence. This is a pragmatic decision reflecting the
desire not to wade into murky water unnecessarily. While this Comment will briefly
look at regulatory takings, the focus of the discussion will be on physical takings,
which are implicated when the state acquires land by prescription. A snapshot of
academic critiques of Supreme Court takings jurisprudence should support this
Comment’s limited endeavor. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE CONSTITUTION 8 (1977) (existing case-law is “but a chaos of confused
argument”); Richard A. Epstein, The Seven Deadly Sins of Takings Law: The Dissents in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 955, 966 (1993)
(takings test is “so amorphous as to defy description”); Douglas W. Kmiec, At Last, the
Supreme Court Solves the Takings Puzzle, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 147, 147 (1995)
(many view takings cases as “incoherent, piecemeal, or categorical”); James E. Krier,
The Takings-Puzzle Puzzle, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143, 1143 (1997) (“law in this area
is a bewildering mess”); Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the Correct “Spin” on Lucas, 45
STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1432 (1993) (the Court has failed “to develop a coherent,
consistent framework for takings analysis”); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause:
In Search of Underlying Principles Part I – A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77
CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1304 (1989) (“[I]t is difficult to imagine a body of case law in
greater doctrinal and conceptual disarray.”); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police
Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37 (1964) (this area of law is best characterized as “a welter of
confusing and apparently incompatible results”); William Michael Treanor, The
Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
782, 887 (1995) (“takings law is plagued by fundamental disagreements”). Cf. Marc
R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 93, 93
(2002) (embracing the vagueness in takings doctrine as both “quite functional and
entirely appropriate”).
64
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I-C. Adverse Possession and Prescriptive Easement
Adverse possession is a possession of land that is inconsistent
68
with the right of the true owner.
When the possession is
accompanied by specific acts, the title will vest in the adverse
69
possessor. To establish title by adverse possession, the trespasser’s
possession must be actual, open and notorious, adverse, exclusive,
70
under a claim of right, and continuous for the statutory period.
An easement is an interest in land granting to one individual the
71
right to use and enjoy another’s land. Unlike an express easement,
where the owner of the dominant estate has been granted the right to
72
use the servient estate, a prescriptive easement is implied from an
individual’s open, adverse, and continuous use of the land for the
73
statutory period.
Although a prescriptive easement bears many similarities to
74
adverse possession, there are two significant differences. First, the
elements necessary to create a prescriptive easement mirror those of
75
76
an adverse possession claim except for the exclusivity requirement.
68

Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, supra note 2, at 219.
Id.
70
Caselaw from different jurisdictions shows the general uniformity of the
elements of adverse possession. See Bonds v. Carter, 75 S.W.3d 192, 198 (Ark. 2002);
Hennessy v. Fairley, 796 A.2d 41, 49 (Me. 2002); Totman v. Malloy, 725 N.E.2d 1045,
1047 (Mass. 2000); Habel v. James, 68 P.3d 743, 746 (Mont. 2003); Nye v. Fire Group
P’ship, 657 N.W.2d 220, 224 (Neb. 2003); Greubele v. Geringer, 640 N.W.2d 454, 457
(N.D. 2002); Francis v. Rogers, 40 P.3d 481, 485 (Okla. 2001); Lewis v. Aslesen, 635
N.W.2d 744, 746 (S.D. 2001); MacDonough-Webster Lodge No. 26 v. Wells, 834 A.2d
25, 35 (Vt. 2003); Hovendick v. Ruby, 10 P.3d 1119, 1122 (Wyo. 2000).
71
Commercial Wharf East Condominium Ass’n v. Waterfront Parking Corp., 552
N.E.2d 66, 73 (Mass. 1990). See Morrill v. Mackman, 24 Mich. 279 (1872); Alban v. R.
K. Co., 239 N.E.2d 22 (Ohio 1968); Brown v. Haley, 355 S.E.2d 563 (Va. 1987).
72
See Yeager v. Tuning, 86 N.E. 657, 658 (Ohio 1908).
73
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 528 (7th ed. 1999).
74
William G. Ackerman & Shane T. Johnson, Outlaws of the Past: A Western
Perspective on Prescription and Adverse Possession, 31 LAND & WATER L. REV. 79, 88
(1996).
75
Beach v. City of Fairbury, 301 N.W.2d 584, 586 (Neb. 1981).
76
Jurisdictions differ to the extent they require exclusiveness as an element of
prescription. Some states do not require it at all. See Neyland v. Hunter, 668 S.W.2d
530, 531 (Ark. 1984); Shellow v. Hagen, 101 N.W.2d 694, 697 (Wis. 1960). Those
states that do retain the requirement of exclusiveness employ it in a less meaningful
fashion than in the adverse possession context. They define exclusivity in this
context, not as a showing that only the claimant made use of the land, but that the
claimant’s use “does not depend on a like right in others.” Schmidt v. Brown, 80
N.E. 1071, 1074 (Ill. 1907). See also Dena Cohen, Note, Exclusiveness in the Law of
Prescription, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 611 (1987) (discussing the different approaches to the
69
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Exclusivity is not possible in a claim for a prescriptive easement
because the owners of the dominant and servient estate may both use
77
the land simultaneously.
A second difference between adverse
possession and a prescriptive easement is the property right that
78
results from each claim. Adverse possession converts the trespasser’s
79
uninterrupted possession into actual title to the property.
Prescription, on the other hand, only gives rise to a limited right to
80
use property in a way as defined by the adverse use.
While the doctrines of adverse possession and prescriptive
easement are commonly thought of in the context of private actors,
the state, and its political subdivisions, can acquire land through such
81
means.
The elements required to acquire land by adverse
possession are the same for a governmental entity as for a private
82
individual. Generally, for private ouster, the adverse possessor is not
required to compensate the former owner for acquiring her
83
Therefore, any requirement for the state actor to
property.
compensate for land acquired by adverse possession must come from
a source other than the common law. This Comment argues that the

exclusive requirement courts have adopted and advocating that this requirement be
dropped from the elements necessary to establish a prescriptive easement).
77
Cohen, supra note 76, at 627-28; see also Phillips v. Bonadies, 136 A. 684, 686
(Conn. 1927) (“[U]ser may be exclusive, though it was participated in by owner of
servient tenement.”); Cramer v. Jenkins, 399 S.W.2d 15, 18 (Mo. 1966) (stating there
is no requirement that “the user must prevent the owner of the land from using it”).
78
Ackerman & Johnson, supra note 74, at 88.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
A. M. Vann, Annotation, Acquisition of Title to Land by Adverse Possession by State
or Other Governmental Unit or Agency, 18 A.L.R.3d 678 (1968). Representative decisions
agreeing with the principle that the state may take land by adverse possession
include: Roche v. Town of Fairfield, 442 A.2d 911 (Conn. 1982); State v. Hays, 785
P.2d 1356 (Kan. 1990); Daley v. Town of Swampscott, 421 N.E.2d 78 (Mass. App. Ct.
1981); Granite County v. Komberec, 800 P.2d 166 (Mont. 1990); Reitsma v. Pascoag
Reservoir & Dam, LLC, 774 A.2d 826 (R.I. 2001); Koontz v. Town of Superior, 746
P.2d 1264 (Wyo. 1987). But see Regard v. Escude, 69 So. 2d 627, 629 (La. Ct. App.
1953) (holding that a “municipality cannot acquire property by prescription”).
Subsequent history of this decision raises the question of whether this is still a valid
statement of law after substantial amendments were made to the Louisiana state
constitution. Parish of Jefferson v. Bonnabel Prop., Inc., 620 So. 2d 1168 (La. 1993).
82
A. M. Vann, supra note 81, at 678; see Williams v. North Carolina State Bd. of
Educ., 147 S.E.2d 381 (N.C. 1966); State v. Vanderkoppel, 19 P.2d 955 (Wyo. 1933).
83
But see Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc., 676 P.2d 584, 591-94 (Cal.
1984) (Reynoso, J., dissenting) (asserting he would affirm the court of appeals
decision requiring the bad faith possessor of a prescriptive easement to compensate
for the fair market value of the easement).
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Fifth Amendment mandates that the government compensate for any
land it acquires through adverse possession.
II. ADVERSE POSSESSION BY THE GOVERNMENT
IS A COMPENSABLE TAKING
In Pascoag Reservoir, the District Court of Rhode Island became
the first federal court to address whether adverse possession by the
84
government gives rise to a compensable taking. It correctly ruled in
the affirmative. The district court surveyed the few state court
85
decisions that had addressed this issue. These state courts have held
the contrary, finding that: (1) no taking has occurred, therefore no
86
compensation is warranted; (2) a taking has occurred but the claim
for just compensation is time-barred due to the passing of the statute
87
of limitations for the prescriptive period; or (3) that compensation
88
is never a part of adverse possession cases. As the district court
pointed out, these decisions are fundamentally flawed for two
89
reasons.
First, many of these courts erroneously rely on Texaco, Inc. v.
90
Short for the proposition that land acquired by a governmental entity
91
through adverse possession is not subject to a takings claim. As the
district court astutely observed, the Texaco decision does not stand for
92
this proposition.
In fact, the case is not even about adverse
84

Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 217.
Id. at 223-24.
86
The Ohio Supreme Court held that after the statutory period for adverse
possession is completed the true owner no longer has title. State ex rel. A.A.A. Inv. v.
City of Columbus, 478 N.E.2d 773, 775 (Ohio 1985) (per curiam). Thereafter, the
state is simply maintaining its possession and can no longer be said to be taking
property. Id. See Bd. of County of Comm’rs v. Flickinger, 687 P.2d 975 (Colo. 1984);
Commonwealth v. Stephens, 407 S.W.2d 711 (Ky. 1966); Dunnick v. Stockgrowers
Bank of Marmouth, 215 N.W.2d 93 (Neb. 1974).
87
See Weidner v. State, 860 P.2d 1205 (Alaska 1993); Stickney v. City of Saco, 770
A.2d 592 (Me. 2001).
88
See Rogers v. Marlin, 754 So. 2d 1267 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999); Krambeck v. City of
Gretna, 254 N.W.2d 691 (Neb. 1977); Algermissen v. Sutin, 61 P.3d 176 (N.M. 2002);
City of Ashland v. Hardesty, 543 P.2d 41 (Or. 1975); Peterson v. Port of Seattle, 618
P.2d 67 (Wash. 1980); Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 348 P.2d 664 (Wash. 1960).
89
Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 224-25.
90
454 U.S. 516 (1982).
91
One state court even went so far as to characterize the case before it as “not
analytically distinguishable from Texaco.” Flickinger, 687 P.2d at 984. See also State ex
rel. A.A.A. Inv., 478 N.E.2d at 775 (listing other authorities, which predate the Texaco
decision, but are consistent with the reasoning in that case).
92
Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 224. The district court made this
85
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93

possession.
In Texaco, a landowner challenged the Indiana Dormant Mineral
94
Interests Act (or “Mineral Lapse Act”) as a taking. The act provided
that, unless the owner filed a claim in the county recorder’s office,
severed mineral interests that had been unused for more than 20
years would be deemed to have been abandoned and would revert to
95
the surface owner. The United States Supreme Court found that
96
this was not an impermissible taking. In oft-quoted language, the
Court stated that, “[i]t is the owner’s failure to make any use of the
property—and not the action of the State—that causes the lapse of
97
the property right.” After abandoning the property, “the former
98
owner retains no interest for which he may claim compensation.”
Relying upon the broad language in Texaco, some courts have
held that the state is not taking property in an adverse possession
case, but it is actually the failure of the true owner to make use of the
99
property that has caused the property right to lapse. These courts
have apparently seized upon some of the Supreme Court’s words,
while ignoring others. The focus is on the “owner’s failure to make
100
any use of the property.” In the instance of adverse possession, it is
accurate to say that the true owner’s failure to inspect the property
and to exercise the right to exclude has contributed to the loss of the
property right. But the true owner’s inaction alone is not sufficient
for the transfer of the property right. The adverse possessor’s
101
affirmative acts must factor into this equation.
The circumstances in Texaco and Pascoag Reservoir are similar in
that there is extended inaction by the true owner, but are different in
102
an important sense. In Texaco, the state is not a trespasser.
The
often-neglected language in Texaco is that the transfer of the property
astute observation.
93
Id.
94
Texaco, Inc., 454 U.S. at 522.
95
Id. at 521.
96
Id. at 530.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
See, e.g., Flickinger, 687 P.2d at 984; State ex rel. A.A.A. Inv., 478 N.E.2d at 775.
100
Texaco, 454 U.S. at 530.
101
To make out a claim for adverse possession, the trespasser’s possession must be
actual, open and notorious, exclusive, adverse, under a claim of right, and
continuous for the statutory period. Taylor, supra note 2, at 78.
102
Texaco is not about adverse possession, but an alleged regulatory taking. See
Texaco, 454 U.S. at 530.
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right under the Mineral Lapse Act is not due to an “action of the
103
State.” On the other hand, in Pascoag Reservoir, the State of Rhode
104
Island is the adverse possessor. The state has actually acquired title
by claiming ownership to the reservoir and using it in a way that is
inconsistent with that of the true owner, continuously for the
105
statutory period. This is a clear situation of the government’s actual
ouster of a private landowner.
Critique of the state court decisions does not end with
highlighting their erroneous reliance on Texaco. The district court in
Pascoag Reservoir observed that, to hold—as a number of state courts
106
had —that the true owner’s takings claim is time-barred after the
statutory period for adverse possession is completed, misstates what is
107
The state courts have
transpiring in adverse possession cases.
mechanically applied the adverse possession doctrine without regard
to the constitutional implications of the government’s physical
invasion of private property for the statutory period—an invasion
108
which falls within the confines of a per se takings rule.
An
examination of the statutes of limitation for the various remedies
available to the true owner for a physical invasion by the government
(i.e., trespass, ejection, and takings) illustrates that the district court’s
holding is analytically sound.
Generally, the statute of limitations for a takings claim against
109
the federal government is six years.
Seeing as there is no federal
statute of limitations for a takings claim against a state government, a
federal district court faced with such a situation will “adopt the
110
analogous state statute of limitations.”
A takings claim is said to
“sound[] in tort” and, therefore, the particular jurisdiction’s statute
111
of limitations for trespass or personal injury is usually applied.
For purposes of illustration, assume—as the state courts
103

Id.
Reitsma, 774 A.2d at 829.
105
Id.
106
Weidner, 860 P.2d at 1212; Flickinger, 687 P.2d at 984; Stephens, 407 S.W.2d at
712; Stickney, 770 A.2d at 603; Dunnick, 215 N.W.2d at 96; State ex rel. A.A.A. Inv., 478
N.E.2d at 775.
107
Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 224.
108
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441 (holding that “a permanent physical occupation of
property is a taking.”).
109
Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (West 2004).
110
Azul Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 948 F.2d 575, 587 (9th Cir. 1991).
111
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 711
(1999).
104
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apparently did—that the takings claim begins to accrue at the
moment that the government first comes into physical occupation of
the land, the moment of actual entry. Imagine the Catch 22 situation
faced by a true owner in a jurisdiction with a two-year statute of
limitations for an action for trespass—and therefore a two-year statute
of limitations for a takings claim against the government—but a tenyear statute of limitations for an action for ejectment. The true
owner’s takings claim would effectively expire on year two, eight years
prior to the property right having actually been taken by the adverse
possessor.
This result can hardly be considered a logical
reconciliation of the adverse possession and takings doctrines.
Diagram 1: Takings claim accrues at the moment of actual entry
SOL for action for trespass (taking) = 2 years
SOL for action for ejectment (adverse possession) = 10 years

Year 0

Year 2

Year 10

Actual Entry;
Takings Claim
accrues

Takings
Claim
expires

Action for Ejectment
expires; State
acquires land by AP

Instead, the true owner’s takings claim should not begin to
accrue until the title vests in the adverse possessor, the moment the
112
true owner’s action for ejectment has expired. Using this moment
as the accrual point would accommodate both the adverse possession
and takings doctrines and afford the true owner all remedies
available at law. For example, if the true owner were to file suit
before year ten, he would eject the government intruder and recover

112

In the Pascoag Reservoir opinion, District Court Judge Lagueux astutely pointed
out that the original owner cannot bring a takings suit until the prescriptive period
has expired, because it is not until the period expires that the adverse possessor can
show a right in the property. Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 224. Prior
to that point, the landowner’s remedies included an action for ejectment and
damages for trespass. Id.
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some measure of damages for the temporary invasion. On year ten,
the true owner’s action for ejectment would expire and the
government would take title to the land by adverse possession. The
true owner would then have until year twelve to seek compensation
for the permanent taking. Any claim brought after year twelve would
be time-barred.
Diagram 2: Takings claim accrues at the moment the action for ejectment expires
SOL for action for trespass (taking) = 2 years
SOL for action for ejectment (adverse possession) = 10 years

Year 0

Year 10

Year 12

Actual
Entry

Action for Ejectment expires;
State acquires land by AP;
Takings Claim accrues

Takings
Claim
expires

A brief survey of the elements of a federal cause of action for a
taking will prove the accuracy of this analysis. The Supreme Court in
114
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank
stated two prerequisites that must be met before the takings claim is
ripe for federal review. First, the governmental entity charged with
implementing the regulations must have reached a final decision
regarding the application of the regulations to the property in
115
116
question.
This is the “final decision requirement.”
Also, the
landowner must have sought, and been denied, just compensation by
117
means of an adequate state procedure.
This is the “state action
118
Decisions by lower courts have indicated that the
requirement.”
113

If the adverse possession claim is terminated prematurely, regardless of
whether the government chose to abandon its adverse possession claim or the true
owner brought suit to eject, the government must compensate for the temporary
invasion. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987).
114
473 U.S. 172 (1985).
115
Id. at 193.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Inadequacy, unavailability, and the futility of seeking the state remedy have
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“final decision” requirement is relaxed in physical occupation cases.
Even with the relaxed “final decision” requirement, a landowner
who is subjected to a physical invasion cannot bring a federal takings
claim if the landowner does not pursue the available state remedy for
120
compensation in a timely fashion.
The timeliness of a state claim
for compensation depends on when the taking actually occurs. For
physical takings, the inquiry is this: at what point does the
government’s physical invasion change in character and nature from
a trespass to a permanent physical occupation? Central to this
inquiry is identifying the point where the invasion shifts from a
temporary limitation on the owner’s right to exclude to a permanent
extinguishment of that owner’s right.
The Supreme Court in Loretto laid down the categorical rule that
121
permanent physical occupations are a compensable taking. Writing
for the Court, Justice Marshall attempted to make the distinction
between temporary and permanent takings. The Justice noted that,
while every physical invasion is not a taking, it is the “permanence
and absolute exclusivity of a physical occupation” that distinguishes it
122
from a temporary limitation.
An owner’s property rights in a
physical thing include the right to possess, use, and dispose of the

been recognized as exceptions to this Williamson “state action requirement.” Pascoag
Reservoir & Dam, 337 F.3d at 92.
119
See id. at 91; Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270, 1282 n.28 (9th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 940 (1988). The Williamson court only provided a
framework for regulatory taking cases. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 185.
120
See Deniz v. Municipality of Guaynabo, 285 F.3d 142, 150 (1st Cir. 2002)
(finding the landowner’s “failure to seek recompense through Puerto Rico’s inverse
condemnation remedy renders both his takings and substantive due process claims
unripe for federal adjudication”); Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 56 F.3d 375,
380 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding federal takings “claim is not yet ripe for review” because
of developer’s failure to seek state remedy); Stern v. Halligan, 158 F.3d 729, 734 (3d
Cir. 1998) (stating that the landowners have not “sought compensation through state
proceedings . . . [and their] takings claim must be rejected”); Gamble v. Eau Claire
County, 5 F.3d 285, 286 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that “[b]y booting her state
compensation remedies [the landowner] forfeited any claim based on the takings
clause to just compensation”); Austin v. City & County of Honolulu, 840 F.2d 678,
680 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that landowner’s “claim is not ripe for review in federal
court because he failed to seek compensation through adequate state remedies”).
121
“[W]hen the character of the governmental action is a permanent physical
occupation of property, our cases uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the
occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an important public
benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner.” Loretto, 458 U.S. at 43435 (citations omitted).
122
Id. at 436 n.12.
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property in an exclusive and unfettered manner.
When the
government permanently occupies physical property, it destroys each
124
of these rights. The owner, then, can no longer put the land to use
125
and is without the power to exclude the intruder.
Central to Justice Marshall’s distinction between temporary and
permanent occupations is the true owner’s right to exclude others
from his property. Traditionally, the power to exclude has been
hailed as “one of the most treasured strands in an owner’s bundle of
126
property rights.” The Court has consistently held that the owner’s
right to exclude is an interest that the state cannot take without
127
compensation. While there are some line-drawing problems at the
boundary of the rule, it is clear that the government’s invasion will be
treated as a permanent physical occupation when the result is to
128
terminate the private owner’s power to exclude.
This understanding of the distinction between a temporary and
permanent physical occupation can be applied to cases of adverse
possession by the government. While the trespasser’s unwanted
presence interferes with the true owner’s right to use and dispose of
129
the property, it does not interfere with the right to exclude.
The
130
true owner retains this right until the prescriptive period passes.
The original owner’s right to exclude is terminated at the point when
131
the statute of limitations on the action for ejectment expires. It is at
this point that the government’s exclusion is properly found to be a
123

Id. at 435.
Id. In more metaphorical terms, Justice Marshall noted that, through physical
occupation “the government does not simply take a single ‘strand’ from the ‘bundle’
of property rights: it chops through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand.” Id.
125
Id. at 436.
126
Id. at 435. See also Int’l News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250
(1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (stating that “[a]n essential element of individual
property is the legal right to exclude others from enjoying it”).
127
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (holding “that the
‘right to exclude,’ so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property
right, falls within this category of interests that the Government cannot take without
compensation”).
128
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436-37. One commentator noted that it appears as if the
Court recognized an exception to the physical invasion rule in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987), by stating that a permanent physical
occupation, that would otherwise be a taking, might be justified as a condition of
securing a land use or development permit. CALLIES, LAND USE, supra note 48, at
305.
129
See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 126 (5th ed. 2002).
130
See id.
131
See id.
124
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permanent physical occupation within the meaning of Loretto.
Therefore, the true owner’s state claim for compensation should not
132
accrue until title vests in the adverse possessor.
This discussion should illustrate the logical failings of the state
court decisions that held a claim for compensation expires with the
133
The takings claim is, most
passing of the prescriptive period.
134
likely, not cognizable until the extinguishment of the true owner’s
132

In the principal case, Pascoag Reservoir, LLC argued that the takings claim did
not accrue until the Supreme Court of Rhode Island unequivocally declared that the
state had acquired title by adverse possession. See Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 337 F.3d
at 95; see also Brief for Petitioner Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC at 14-16, Pascoag
Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island, 72 U.S.L.W. 3406 (U.S. Dec. 15, 2003) (No.
03-597). To support this position, Pascoag Reservoir, LLC cited United States v.
Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947), a case that involved the intermittent flooding of an
individual’s property. Writing for the Court in Dickinson, Justice Frankfurter noted
that the Government, by condemnation, could have “fixed” the time when the
property was taken, but instead left the taking up to physical events. 331 U.S. at 74748. This puts the “onus” on the landowner to determine the decisive moment when
there is no question that the government has confiscated the property. Id. at 748.
Acknowledging that a taking by flooding is a continuous process, Justice Frankfurter
declared that suit for compensation may be delayed “until the situation becomes
stabilized.” Id. at 749. The Court held that, “when the Government chooses not to
condemn land but to bring about a taking by a continuing process of physical events,
the owner is not required to resort to either piecemeal or premature litigation to
ascertain just compensation for what is really ‘taken.’” Id. The landowner can wait
to bring suit until the character of the government’s action is unquestionably a
taking. Id.
Pascoag Reservoir, LLC maintained that it did not fail the second Williamson
prong, the “state action” requirement. It argued that adverse possession by the
government was a taking by a continuous process of physical events and had not
stabilized until the Supreme Court of Rhode Island clearly rendered title to the state
via adverse possession. Reitsma, 774 A.2d at 838. The First Circuit rejected this
argument, stating that a valid claim of adverse possession requires open and
notorious possession by the trespasser. Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 337 F.3d at 95.
Therefore, the court determined that the former landowner should have been aware
of a cognizable takings claim prior to the decision of the Rhode Island Supreme
Court. Id.
133
See Weidner v. State, 860 P.2d 1205 (Alaska 1993); Stickney v. City of Saco, 770
A.2d 592 (Me. 2001).
134
A permanent physical occupation may be found when other interests are
infringed upon, even though the landowner maintains the right to exclude. Justice
Marshall noted that, the “deprivation of the right to use and obtain a profit from
property is not, in every case, independently sufficient to establish a taking.” Loretto,
458 U.S. at 436 (emphasis added). Marshall leaves open the possibility that the
deprivation of these other rights may, in some cases, be sufficient to give rise to a
permanent physical occupation. Id. The court will undertake a “more complex
balancing process” to evaluate those physical invasions that do not totally dispose the
owner of the right to exclude. Id. at 436 n.12. The balancing test that Justice
Marshall hints at signals a possible application of the “ad hoc, factual inquiries”
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right to exclude. The state claim for just compensation begins to
accrue at the moment title is vested in the adverse possessor.
Accruing the statute of limitations for the takings claim from the
moment of actual entry would create an anomalous situation in
which the takings claim would expire prior the property having
actually been taken.
III. REQUIRING THE GOVERNMENT TO COMPENSATE FOR LAND TAKEN
BY ADVERSE POSSESSION WILL NOT UNDERMINE THE RATIONALES
UNDERLYING THE DOCTRINE
Some would argue that requiring the government to pay just
compensation for land acquired by adverse possession is a sub silentio
prohibition on adverse possession by the government. To be clear,
this Comment does not contest that a state may acquire land by
adverse possession. It is well settled in caselaw and legal scholarship
135
that a state may acquire land through such means.
Rather, this
Comment argues that this acquisition of land creates in the true
owner a right to compensation, a right that must be executed within
the relevant statutory period.
Requiring the government to
compensate in this limited context does not subvert the government’s
right to acquire land by adverse possession. The compensation
requirement does not undermine the rationales behind the adverse
possession doctrine.
The doctrine of adverse possession appears to be an irregularity
within our property regime given our systematic preference for
136
property rights over mere possessory rights.
Professor Thomas
Merrill’s classic article, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse
137
Possession, sets forth the main justifications underlying the doctrine
of adverse possession, validating its place in our property regime.
Merrill explains that there are four justifications that support
transferring the title to the adverse possessor after the expiration of
the statute of limitations: the lost evidence, quieting title, sleeping
described by the Court in Penn Central. This suggests that the analysis for physical
and regulatory takings are not mutually exclusive and that it is only those physical
occupations that undeniably sever the landowner’s right to exclude that are easily
resolved under Loretto’s per se rule.
135
See, e.g., Roche, 442 A.2d 911; Hays, 785 P.2d 1356; Daley, 421 N.E.2d 78;
Komberec, 800 P.2d 166; Reitsma, 774 A.2d 826; Koontz, 746 P.2d 1264.
136
See, e.g., Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, supra note 2, at 135 (noting that
“the doctrine apparently affords an anomalous instance of maturing a wrong into a
right”).
137
Merrill, supra note 1, at 1128-32.
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138

owner, and reliance rationales.
Merrill argues that requiring
compensation (or indemnification) for land acquired by adverse
possession in the context of private actors would undermine these
rationales. The same cannot be said when the government is the
adverse possessor.
The first justification, the lost evidence rationale, is reminiscent
139
of the policy argument invoked in favor of statutes of limitation.
This is a common sense and pragmatic rationale recognizing the
140
greater social benefit in repose.
The quality and quantity of
evidentiary material deteriorates with time and the parties will have to
141
bear greater litigation expenses to find, or corroborate, evidence.
Of course, any resulting judicial determination based on an imperfect
142
The adverse
record will more likely be fraught with error.
possession doctrine removes this concern by eliminating many
143
remote claims.
The second justification for the doctrine of adverse possession is
144
the quieting title rationale.
The existence of remote claims on
145
Without the adverse
property impairs the marketability of title.
possession mechanism, a purchaser of property would have to follow
the chain of title to its source so as to identify any remote interests in
146
the property, trace them to their present day successors, and then
138

Id. at 1133.
Statutes of limitation “are practical and pragmatic devices to spare the courts
from litigation of stale claims, and the citizen from being put to his defense after
memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence is lost.”
Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945). See Bd. of Regents v.
Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 485 (1980); United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117
(1979); Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965).
140
Merrill, supra note 1, at 1128.
141
Id.
142
Id. See also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.12 (6th ed.
2003) (positing adverse possession reduces “error costs that are caused by using stale
evidence to decide a dispute”).
143
Merrill, supra note 1, at 1128. Merrill notes that with the implementation of
the recording acts across the states and the availability of professional title surveys for
a reasonable cost, this rationale may not be as important today as in Seventeenth
Century England. Id. But the lost evidence rationale is still able to address those
situations where a title contains errors and omissions, or public records are
destroyed. Id.
144
Henry W. Ballantine maintained that the “great purpose” of the adverse
possession doctrine is “to quiet all titles which are openly and consistently asserted,
to provide proof of meritorious titles, and correct errors in conveyancing.”
Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, supra note 2, at 135.
145
Merrill, supra note 1, at 1129.
146
Such interests could include “ancient easements, unextinguished spousal
139
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147

negotiate their release.
Adverse possession actually reduces the
148
drag on the market by extinguishing many of these claims.
The sleeping owner rationale is the third justification for the
149
adverse possession doctrine. Adverse possession punishes the true
owner for engaging in poor custodial practices, or in other words,
150
sleeping on his rights.
The doctrine requires that the true owner
151
periodically visit the property and assert the right to exclude. Like
the quieting title rationale, this rationale has the effect of facilitating
152
land transactions.
A diligent owner’s periodic policing of the
153
property will have the effect of flushing out offers for purchase.
The reliance rationale is the final justification for adverse
possession. The general policy is that the law should value the
reliance interest the possessor develops through his or her
154
longstanding possession of the property.
Professor Merrill
expressed the four different accounts of the reliance rationale that
155
have been raised in academia.
There is an interest in respecting
the personal attachment that the possessor feels with the property, in
preserving the peace, and protecting the economic reliance by both
156
the possessor and third parties.
The first account, the property as personhood notion, focuses
on the sense of personal attachment that one develops to the
157
property in her possession. The adverse possessor may develop an
158
The
attachment to the property that is critical to her identity.
rights, grants of future interests, unreleased mortgages or liens.” Id.
147
Hold outs and other opportunistic behavior by the owners of these remote
interests would be yet another—potentially costly—hurdle to overcome.
148
Id. See also Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 UNIV. OF CHI. L.
REV. 73, 81 (1988) (“[C]lear titles facilitate trade and minimize resource-wasting
conflict.”).
149
Merrill, supra note 1, at 1130.
150
Id. See also Rose, supra note 148, at 79 (noting that adverse possession is “a
wonderful example of reward to useful labor, at the expense of the sluggard”).
151
Merrill, supra note 1, at 1130.
152
Id. at 1130-31.
153
This is for the obvious reason that it is tough to purchase land from an absent
owner. Id. at 1130.
154
Id. at 1131.
155
Merrill, supra note 1, at 1131.
156
Id. at 1131-32.
157
Id. at 1131.
158
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957 (1982)
(explaining that “[t]he premise underlying the personhood perspective is that to
achieve proper self-development . . . an individual needs some control over resources
in the external environment”).
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second account, the preserving the peace notion, coincides with the
property as personhood argument. The idea is that after lengthy
occupation, the adverse possessor will become attached to the
property and any subsequent attempt to vanquish the adverse
159
possessor will result in violence.
The third account, the notion of
sunk costs or quasi rents, looks at the economic reliance of the
160
adverse possessor.
An adverse possessor who has made
improvements on the land is in an inferior bargaining position in any
161
future negotiations to buy the property.
This results from the
common law doctrine of accession, where a property owner has the
162
Had negotiations
right to any improvements made to his land.
taken place before the adverse possessor had made such
improvements, the true owner would only be able to extract fair
163
market value for the land.
But in any negotiations subsequent to
the improvements, the true owner can seek more, putting the adverse
possessor in the position of anteing up in order to preserve his
164
investment in the land. The final account of the reliance rationale
159

See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477
(1897) (“A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own for a long time,
whether property or an opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be torn away
without your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, however you came by
it.”). The preserving the peace rationale has been expressed in landlord-tenant law
with regard to a landlord’s self-help for a tenant in breach who fails to abandon or
surrender the premises. The common law rule was that a landlord may retake the
premises from the tenant in possession if the landlord is legally entitled to possession
and the means of reentry are peaceable. Berg v. Wiley, 264 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn.
1978). See also Wilder v. House, 48 Ill. 279, 279 (1868) (landlord has “no right to
resort to force”); Stone v. Lahey, 133 Mass. 426, 427 (1882) (may remove tenant
without using “unreasonable force”); Rich v. Keyser, 54 Pa. 86, 86 (1867) (may retake
property if “done without breach of the peace”). A number of courts, fearing the
“violent breach of peace” that may occur during landlord self-help have departed
from the common law rule and have required the landlord to seek remedy through
the judicial process. Berg, 264 N.W.2d at 151 (noting that at least 16 jurisdictions
have changed from the early common law rule).
160
Merrill, supra note 1, at 1131.
161
This is the notion of sunk costs or quasi-rents. Id.
162
Accession is defined as “[a] property owner’s right to all that is added to land,
naturally or by labor, including land left by floods and improvements made by
another.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 13 (7th ed. 1999). The modern trend among
jurisdictions is to mitigate the harsh application of this doctrine by either legislative
reform (“occupying claimant” or “betterment” acts) or judicial decisions
emphasizing fairness to the innocent improver (Manillo v. Gorski, 54 N.J. 378
(1969)). DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 129, at 152-53.
163
Merrill, supra note 1, at 1131.
164
The adverse possessor must either pay the price the true owner commands or
forfeit the improvements made on the land. Id. at 1130.
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looks beyond the scope of the adverse possessor/true owner dynamic
165
and focuses on the economic reliance of third parties. There may
be third parties, such as subsequent purchasers, with a valid interest
166
in the entitlement.
The doctrine of adverse possession protects
these individuals who, based on the adverse possessor’s unfettered
use of the property, have mistaken the adverse possessor for the true
167
owner.
Professor Merrill defends the fact that title is granted to the
adverse possessor without any liability to indemnify the true owner,
arguing that, if required, indemnification would undermine the basis
168
for this institution. Indemnification would require an inquiry into
the value necessary to fairly compensate all parties who have an
interest in the property, interfering with the lost evidence and
169
quieting title rationales.
When an individual acquires title by
adverse possession, the title is deemed to “relate back” to the date of
170
So a claim for indemnification would require an
actual entry.
171
inquiry into the value of the property on the date of actual entry.
Such evidence relating to the value of the property may not be
172
forthcoming due to the passage of time. Also, the requirement of
indemnification would result in all holders of remote or fractional
173
interests in the property lining up to claim their share of the
174
Consequently, the litigation necessary to secure title by
proceeds.
175
adverse possession would be much more expensive. Title insurance
companies would accommodate this risk by raising premiums,
165

Id. at 1132.
Interested third parties could include “vendors, creditors, contractors, tenants,
[and] subsequent purchasers.” Id.
167
Id. Public recording acts, however, are supposed to protect third parties from
making such a mistake. Id.
168
Id. at 1126.
169
Id. at 1146-48.
170
Merrill, supra note 1, at 1147.
171
Id.
172
The prescriptive period can vary greatly depending on the jurisdiction. See CA.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 325 (West 1982) (5 years); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-30 (West 2000)
(30 years for real estate or 60 years for woodlands and uncultivated tracts). See J & M
Land Co. v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 766 A.2d 1110 (N.J. 2001) (reaffirming that the
30/60 year statute is the applicable limitations period for an adverse possession
claim).
173
The interests could include: “ancient easements, unextinguished spousal
rights, grants of future interests, unreleased mortgages or liens.” Merrill, supra note
1, at 1129.
174
Id. at 1148.
175
Id.
166

2005

COMMENT

691
176

resulting in an additional drag on the alienability of property rights.
Indemnification also reduces the true owner’s incentive to assert
the right to exclude, therefore interfering with the sleeping owner
177
rationale.
Indemnification provides less incentive for the true
178
owner to adopt good custodial practices.
What is more of an
incentive to keep diligent custodial practices than the current
doctrine, where a true owner who fails to bring action within the
179
statutory period would lose title to the adverse possessor?
Finally, indemnification would undermine the reliance interests
of adverse possessors and interested third parties “by imposing a onetime tax on the adverse possessor equal to 100% of the market
180
value.”
The adverse possessor would be given the ultimatum to
181
either pay this tax or lose the property. Imagine the frustration of
third parties who reasonably relied on the adverse possessor’s
appearance of title if the adverse possessor is unable or unwilling to
182
pay this fee.
But the four rationales that Professor Merrill expressed are not
undermined when the state, as the adverse possessor, is required to
compensate the true owner. The lost evidence, quieting title, and
sleeping owner rationales are sustained by the statute of limitations
for the takings claim. As discussed in Part II, a true owner must first
seek and be denied compensation by an adequate state procedure
183
before being able to bring suit in federal court.
Each individual
jurisdiction will have a statute of limitation on the right to seek
compensation. A true owner who does not timely file this claim with
the state fails to satisfy the Williamson County prerequisites for a
takings claim and will be forever barred from compensation.
Consequently, the projections of owners of remote and fractional
interests lining up to collect their just compensation, and therefore
undermining the lost evidence and quieting title rationales, will only
happen in the rarest of cases where the true owner, sloth to respond
to the open and notorious adverse possession over many years, will be
inclined to seek compensation within a more limited period of time.
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183

Id.
Id.
Id.
Merrill, supra note 1, at 1148.
Id. at 1149.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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Similarly, it is unlikely that the potential for compensation will create
a disincentive for true owners to police their property, and therefore
undermine the sleeping owner rationale, because the claim for
compensation is confined to a narrow statutory period. In any case,
an owner who sleeps on his or her rights will be ousted from his or
her land and barred from compensation.
Most importantly, the compensation requirement does not
jeopardize the government’s reliance interests in the property
adversely possessed.
It is important to note that, although
compelling when the adverse possessor is a private party, the four
expressions of the reliance rationale do not apply with the same force
when the state is the adverse possessor. This leaves the compensation
requirement little to undermine.
The property as personhood notion is a particularly weak
justification. It is tough to envision how a political entity, such as a
municipal board of electors, would need control over resources to
184
“achieve proper self-development.”
The preserving the peace
rationale is an equally weak justification to stand on because violence
may always result from one person’s attempt to recapture property
from another. While the potential for violence depends on the
tendencies of the particular individual, it is less likely to occur when
one is trying to recapture property from the state. The state’s
overwhelming superiority—embodied in the police power—would be
a disincentive for either party to resort to violence.
With respect to the third account, the state’s economic reliance
is not as seriously imperiled here as it is with a private party. The
notion of sunk costs or quasi rents has no applicability when the state
is the adverse possessor. The accession doctrine, even in its harsh
common law form, will not relegate the state to an inferior
bargaining position. The true owner will never hold the state “over a
185
barrel” in future negotiations, because the state can always exercise
the power of eminent domain. Depending on the procedure in the
particular jurisdiction, condemnation results in either a forced sale
with the value of the land determined by the court or a supposed,
186
voluntary sale in the shadow of the state’s ability to force a sale. In
184

Radin, supra note 158, at 957.
Merrill, supra note 1, at 1131.
186
Condemnation procedure actually puts the state in a superior bargaining
position because the state can condemn the land, paying whatever amount of
compensation it deems appropriate. The condemnee could then appeal the amount
of compensation. Some states require pre-condemnation activity before the
185

2005

COMMENT

693

either situation, the state will pay a fair price.
The fourth account, the reliance interest of third parties who
have changed their position based on the adverse possessor’s
appearance as the owner of title, is the soundest of the four reliance
rationales. The economic reliance interest of third parties could be
seriously undermined by the requirement of compensation if the
state were unwilling or unable to pay. Again however, inroads on the
reliance rationale are curbed by the statute of limitations for
compensation.
IV. THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT EXEMPT FROM PAYING COMPENSATION
BECAUSE ADVERSE POSSESSION IS NOT A BACKGROUND PRINCIPLE OF
STATE PROPERTY LAW
The Takings Clause is a fundamental limitation that protects
against government overreaching on private property rights and it
may not be excused by the common law doctrine of adverse
possession. The power of eminent domain plays a unique role in
civilized government. With this power, the government may coerce
the transactions that are necessary to implement omnibus programs
for the good of all and to avoid the obstacles typically associated with
187
the commons, such as transaction costs, hold outs, and free riders.
The exercise of this power is limited by the Takings Clause, which
ensures that private property is not taken for public use without just
188
compensation.
Common law principles should not excuse the government from
this limitation. The government cannot trample upon the interests
of a citizen that it was designed to protect, and then claim that the
Takings Clause does not apply to it because the invasion exceeded
condemnor can get judicial determination of the amount of compensation. See, e.g.,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:3-1 et seq. (West 1997) (declaration of taking, deposit the
estimated compensation with court, commissioners to determine compensation);
N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 101 et seq. (McKinney 2002) (public hearing, appraisals,
negotiations and offer); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 2805 et seq. (2003) (offer, public
hearing, selectmen to determine just compensation). Some states have “quick take”
procedures that allow the condemnor to take title after giving notice to the
condemnee and depositing compensation with the court. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 117.042 (West 1997); N.H. STAT. ANN. § 498-A:5 (2003).
187
EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 5. POSNER, supra note 142, at § 3.7. Posner describes
the classic example of a hold out–the landowner in the path of advancing railroad
tracks. Id. Recognizing the high cost of abandoning or altering the course of the
railroad after starting it, the landowner could hold out for a higher price. Id. The
landowner could get much more for the land than it is worth. Id.
188
EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 5.
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the prescriptive period. To permit such a result misunderstands the
very foundation of American government, the bedrock principle of
which is to ensure the security of the people’s life, liberty, and
189
property.
At first glance, it appears that the Supreme Court in Lucas has
narrowed the reach of the Takings Clause by common law principles.
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia laid down the second categorical
190
rule on takings and the now famous “nuisance exception.”
The
Court held that a regulation that deprives the landowner of all
economically beneficial use of the land requires compensation unless
the restriction is one that the “background principles of the State’s
191
law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.”
The idea is that the property owner may only suffer a confiscation of
192
those interests that were part of his title to begin with.
This limitation on the Fifth Amendment’s requirement that
private land may not be taken for public use without just
compensation is consistent with the purpose of civil government—to
193
protect established property interests and entitlements.
For
example, common law nuisance is grounded in the principle that no
one has the right to use land in such a way as to injure that of
194
another.
The government need not compensate for regulations
that purport to abate a nuisance because they are rightfully wielding
their monopoly of force to protect and secure the interests of those
195
individuals who would be affected by the impending nuisance.
189

During the Constitutional Convention, Alexander Hamilton noted that, “one
great object of Government is personal protection and the security of Property.”
Andrew S. Gold, Regulatory Takings and Original Intent: The Direct, Physical Takings
Thesis “Goes Too Far,” 49 AM. U. L. REV. 181, 195 (1999) (quoting from 1 Records of
the Federal Convention of 1787, at 302 (Max Farrand ed., 1937)); see also THE
FEDERALIST No. 54, at 351 (James Madison or Alexander Hamilton) (Robert
Scigliano ed., 2000) (“Government is instituted no less for protection of the
property, than of the persons, of individuals.”).
190
Justice Stevens actually coined the name of the exception. See Lucas, 505 U.S.
at 1067-68 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
191
Id. at 1029.
192
The government may “resist compensation only if the logically antecedent
inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use interests
were not part of his title to begin with.” Id. at 1027 (emphasis added).
193
EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 5.
194
The underlying principle for common law nuisance is the maxim, sic utere tuo
ut alienum non laedas (meaning “so use your own as not to injure another’s
property”). BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1690 (7th ed. 1999).
195
See Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 799 A.2d 751, 774 (Pa.
2002) (noting that if the state can prove that surface coal mining within Watershed
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The Lucas Court did not indicate what other background
196
Some
principles of state property law fall under this exception.
197
198
courts have found that custom
and public trust
are such
principles. Therefore, a government regulation that restricted a
private landowner’s rights would not be a compensable taking if the
land was held in public trust or customary rights are implicated.
Again, this limitation on the Fifth Amendment’s requirements is
consistent with our government’s commissioned purpose to protect
and secure existing property interests. Such regulations do not
require compensation because they protect land that the public has
an established interest in from limitation by a private owner.
It might be argued that adverse possession is one of these
199
background principles of state property law.
While the Court’s
treatment of background principles has been too sparse to suggest
the direction it will take in the future, it is unlikely that adverse
200
possession will be found a background principle.
Adverse
area “would unreasonably interfere with the public right to unpolluted water” then
the mining can be prohibited without compensation); State v. The Mill, 887 P.2d
993, 1002 (Colo. 1995) (concluding that state nuisance law prohibited landowner
from engaging in activities that would spread radioactive contamination and that
state regulations to that effect did not constitute a taking).
196
For an academic discussion on this issue, see David L. Callies & J. David
Breemer, Selected Legal and Policy Trends in Takings Law: Background Principles, Custom
and Public Trust “Exceptions” and the (Mis)Use of Investment-Backed Expectations, 36 VAL.
U. L. REV. 339 (2002); David L. Callies, Custom and Public Trust: Background Principles
of State Property Law?, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10003 (2000).
197
See Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456-57 (Or. 1993) (holding
landowner had no right to develop dry sand areas of beach because common law
doctrine of custom protects the public’s use of these areas), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1207
(1994); David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access and Judicial
Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375 (1996); Paul M. Sullivan, Customary Revolutions: The
Law of Custom and the Conflict of Traditions in Hawaii, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 99 (1998).
198
See McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 120 (S.C. 2003) (holding
landowner had no right to develop tidelands on his lots because the tidelands are
public trust property under state control), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 466 (2003); Hope M.
Babcock, Has the U.S. Supreme Court Finally Drained the Swamp of Takings Jurisprudence?:
The Impact of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on Wetlands and Coastal Barrier
Beaches, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1995).
199
The State of Rhode Island raised this argument in district court. Pascoag
Reservoir & Dam, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 226. Rejecting this argument, the court stated
that the only application of the “background principles of state property law” have
been to excuse compensation for regulatory takings. Id. Whether the Supreme
Court would apply this exception to permanent physical occupations, such as adverse
possession, is yet to be seen. Id. Cf. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 60
Fed. Cl. 230, 239 (2004) (holding that the background principles exception applies
to both regulatory and physical takings).
200
Background principles have only cropped up in three Supreme Court
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possession, nuisance, custom, and public trust are similar in that they
are all established common law doctrines. But adverse possession
differs from the other three, in that it impacts purely private interests.
201
Protection of public rights is not in the calculus.
Common law principles should not abrogate a fundamental
constitutional limitation. One possible reading of Lucas suggests that
the government should not get the benefit of these common law
principles unless the result is consistent with the framework upon
which our republic was founded. The “background principles of
state property law,” or “nuisance” exception, fits within this
framework, with each instance emphasizing the protection of
established property rights and entitlements. To consider adverse
possession as such a principle would be antithetic to this
understanding of the role of government, permitting unrestrained
confiscation by the government of the very private rights it was set to
protect.
CONCLUSION
The sovereign’s respect for the property rights of its citizens is a
pillar upon which this nation was formed. The Framers recognized
the inherent right of the sovereign to take land for public good, but
limited such power by requiring that its use be only for a public
purpose and that the landowner receive just compensation for the
private rights confiscated. To allow any intrusion upon this principle
by virtue of the common law doctrine of adverse possession would be
an impermissible expansion of the sovereign’s power.
A government entity’s acquisition of land by adverse possession
decisions. Justice Scalia first coined the phrase in Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. Justice
Scalia again took up the discussion on background principles of state property law in
Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207 (1994). In an opinion dissenting from
the denial of certiorari, the Justice questioned whether the facts were such that the
Supreme Court of Oregon could declare the requirements of custom were satisfied.
Id. at 1212. The Supreme Court of Oregon had found that the City’s denial of a
permit to construct on beach lots was not an uncompensated taking under the Fifth
Amendment because under the state’s law of custom, the proscribed interests were
not part of the landowner’s title. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449 (Or.
1993) (en banc). Also, treatment of background principles briefly surfaced in Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 115 n.1 (2000) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (illustrating that the
constitutional guarantee of the Fifth Amendment would offer no protection if the
antecedent inquiry into state background principles ended with a final decision of
the state’s highest court).
201
Considerations of public interest are essential to the doctrines of nuisance,
custom, and public trust.
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is a compensable taking. The few state courts to hold to the contrary
reasoned with a misplaced emphasis on Texaco v. Short and
mechanically applied the adverse possession doctrine in a manner
that blatantly ignores the constitutional implications of the state’s
intrusion on private property—an action that falls within the purview
of Loretto’s physical takings rule. Requiring compensation will not
undermine the four rationales for the doctrine of adverse possession
or otherwise act as a sub silentio prohibition on adverse possession by
the government. The government’s power of eminent domain and
the statute of limitations for the takings claim mitigate any potential
harmful effects that compensation has on these rationales. Finally,
the government is not exempt from paying compensation because
adverse possession is not a “background principle of state property
law” as contemplated by the Court in Lucas.

